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INTRODUCTION
Over the past few decades, debates have raged worldwide
about the extent to which the human body and its component
parts should be bought, sold, rented, or donated.1 Gestational
surrogacy2 in particular has become more popular in recent
years and, in an increasing number of cases, individuals wishing
to obtain the services of a surrogate are leaving their own
countries to do so.3 The subject of surrogacy brings with it a host
of concerns, including ethical worries over exploitation of
surrogates in the global marketplace, the increasing potential
for reproductive tourism as a result of national differences in
regulation, and the geographic and socioeconomic imbalances
between providers and purchasers. It is therefore worthwhile to
examine more thoroughly the need for—and mechanisms for
creating—international regulation to protect all parties involved
in international gestational surrogacy.
This Article expands the global gestational surrogacy
debate by analyzing surrogacy’s potential as a subject of
international regulation, particularly under the trade and labor
frameworks. This Article recognizes that surrogacy’s complexity
as a legal issue is such that regulation would require a broadbased instrument that is unlikely to have the necessary political
will behind it. Further, this Article accepts the premise that
different legal frameworks are likely to have different impacts on
the rights and interests of parties,4 and examines the feasibility
1. Examples of such debates include those surrounding the legal status of sex
work (and its relationship to sex trafficking and human slavery), standards for organ
and tissue procurement and transplantation (including debates about the feasibility
and defensibility of nonreproductive organ sales), gamete donation or sale (for both
reproduction and scientific research), and gestational surrogacy (particularly when the
surrogate’s identity is unknown to the procurer of the surrogate’s services).
2. In gestational surrogacy, a surrogate mother carries and births a child that is
genetically unrelated to her. See Brigitte Clark, Surrogate Motherhood: Comment on the
South African Law Commission’s Report on Surrogate Motherhood (Project 65), 110 S.
AFR. L.J. 769, 769 (1993). Some surrogacy arrangements, sometimes called “partial
surrogacy,” involve the use of the surrogate mother’s egg. See id. at 769–70. This Article,
however, limits its discussion to gestational surrogacy.
3. See, e.g., Usha Rengachary Smerdon, Crossing Bodies, Crossing Borders:
International Surrogacy Between the United States and India, 39 CUMB. L. REV. 15, 15–16,
23–27 (2008).
4. See, e.g., Bartha M. Knoppers, Reproductive Technology and International
Mechanisms of Protection of the Human Person, 32 MCGILL L.J. 336, 338 (1987) (noting
that different international instruments adopt different perspectives regarding rights).
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and effects of regulating surrogacy in a new, narrowly focused
international instrument under the auspices of either the World
Trade Organization or the International Labour Organization.
Ultimately, this Article concludes that, while both platforms and
legal frameworks face many challenges, the regulation of
surrogacy in a new instrument under the ILO is an acceptable, if
still imperfect, alternative to a comprehensive instrument
introduced through the United Nations General Assembly.
I. BACKGROUND: THE GLOBAL TRADE IN WOMBS
Traditionally, surrogacy was sought by infertile heterosexual
couples, but now is increasingly sought by gay couples,
particularly men, as a way of having children that are
biologically related to one parent.5 The concept of surrogacy
itself is not new; indeed, surrogacy scholars are fond of making
references to biblical stories of partial surrogacy.6 Transnational
gestational surrogacy operations are relatively recent
phenomena, however, and are becoming increasingly common,
particularly in Eastern Europe,7 India,8 and certain US states.9

Although Knoppers’s article focuses on human genetic material, many of its
conclusions and arguments are applicable to similar concerns underlying surrogacy.
See, e.g., A.M. Capron & M.J. Radin, Choosing Family Law over Contract Law as a Paradigm
for Surrogate Motherhood, 16 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 34, 37 (1988) (arguing, inter
alia, that the application of adoption law to children born of surrogacy arrangements
would protect the interests of the child).
5. See, e.g., Susan Donaldson James, More Gay Men Choose Surrogacy to Have
Children, ABC NEWS, Mar. 12, 2008, http://abcnews.go.com/Entertainment/OnCall/
story?id=4439567&page=1.
6. See, e.g., Smerdon, supra note 3, at 16 (citing the Old Testament stories about
the impregnation of Hagar, Sarah’s maid, by Abraham, and of Bilhah, Rachel’s maid,
by Jacob); Jennifer Rimm, Comment, Booming Baby Business: Regulating Commercial
Surrogacy in India, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1429, 1437 (2009).
7. See Anne Donchin, Reproductive Tourism and the Quest for Global Gender Justice, 24
BIOETHICS 323, 327 n.19 (2010); Lisa C. Ikemoto, Reproductive Tourism: Equality
Concerns in the Global Market for Fertility Services, 27 LAW & INEQUALITY 277, 299 (2009).
8. See, e.g., Donchin, supra note 7, at 327 n.19; Ruby L. Lee, Note, New Trends in
Global Outsourcing of Commercial Surrogacy: A Call for Regulation, 20 HASTINGS WOMEN’S
L.J. 275, 276–77, 284 (2009); Amelia Gentleman, India Nurtures Business of Surrogate
Motherhood, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2008, at A9 (noting that while exact statistics are
difficult to find, “anecdotal evidence suggests a sharp increase” in out-of-country
surrogate usage, particularly from India, which tend to be less expensive than surrogacy
services in, for example, the United States).
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The decision to go abroad for these reproductive services often
is triggered by substantive differences in national laws.10 For
example, surrogacy is prohibited in several European countries,
even as a remedy for infertility,11 and is permitted but carefully
regulated in other countries, including parts of the United
States.12
India’s surrogacy industry has received perhaps the most
attention.13 The surrogacy process in India is reportedly less
expensive than in Canada or the United States, and the industry
is largely unregulated.14 According to research conducted by US
journalists on one Indian clinic, a surrogate pregnancy there
costs approximately US$12,000 (of which the surrogate mother
may earn between US$5000 and US$7000 for her services15), as
opposed to costs of up to US$80,000 for the same services in the
United States.16 Other estimates put the total costs of surrogacy
in India at US$10,000 to US$35,000 per pregnancy, and at
US$59,000 to US$80,000 per pregnancy in the United States.17
The trend toward surrogacy globalization and, in particular,
toward surrogacy tourism in a few favorable—and inexpensive—
parts of the world, has raised concerns about the need to
develop and implement measures on a global level to ensure

9. See Lee, supra note 8, at 276–77; Scott Friedman, International Surrogacy Ripening
in Texas, NBC DALLAS-FT. WORTH (May 13, 2010, 11:14 PM), http://www.nbcdfw.com/
news/health/International-Surrogacy-Ripening-in-Texas-93688734.html.
10. Ikemoto, supra note 7, at 295, 299.
11. See Margaret Ryznar, International Commercial Surrogacy and Its Parties, 43 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 1009, 1016 (2010).
12. See Smerdon, supra note 3, at 24–26.
13. See Ryznar, supra note 11, at 1012–16. See generally Smerdon, supra note 3;
Rimm, supra note 6.
14. See Amrita Pande, “At Least I Am Not Sleeping with Anyone”: Resisting the Stigma of
Commercial Surrogacy in India, 36 FEMINIST STUD. 292, 295 (2010). To date, the Assisted
Reproductive Technologies Regulation Bill, which would provide standards for the
surrogacy industry (albeit “friendly” ones, according to the author), and make
surrogacy contracts binding and enforceable, has not yet been enacted into law.
15. Smerdon, supra note 3, at 50.
16. See Journey to Parenthood, OPRAH WINFREY SHOW (Jan. 1, 2006),
http://www.oprah.com/world/Wombs-for-Rent.
17. See Smerdon, supra note 3, at 32; see also Ryznar, supra note 11, at 1018–19
(citing US$25,000 to US$30,000 as the estimated cost of Indian surrogacy, noting that
such costs are around one-third the cost of US surrogacy, and citing US$6000 to
US$10,000 as the amount retained by the Indian surrogate).
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that exploitation does not occur in the industry.18 Presently,
however, no surrogacy-specific international instrument or
regulatory scheme exists.19
II. ETHICAL AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The human body is the vessel in which a person navigates
his or her life. As such, it is commonly viewed in the legal
context as deserving of special care and protection, particularly
with regard to the circumstances in which it may be bought,
sold, or rented.20 Generally speaking, however, there appears to
be a greater tolerance for the commercialization of reproductive
services (e.g., buying and selling gametes for reproduction or
renting female sex organs for gestational surrogacy21) compared
to bodily services that do not involve reproduction (e.g.,
prohibitions on buying and selling nonreproductive organs or
renting female sex organs for nonprocreative sexual
recreation).22 Significantly, the World Health Organization’s
18. See Casey Humbyrd, Fair Trade International Surrogacy, 9 DEVELOPING WORLD
BIOETHICS 111, 116 (2009); Lee, supra note 8, at 299; Angie Godwin McEwen, Note, So
You’re Having Another Woman’s Baby: Economics and Exploitation in Gestational Surrogacy,
32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 271, 303–04 (1999). For a parallel discussion of global
ethics, see Heather Widdows, Localized Past, Globalized Future: Towards an Effective
Bioethical Framework Using Examples from Population Genetics and Medical Tourism, 25
BIOETHICS 83, 84 (2011) (arguing that “effective ethical frameworks must be global”
and must “recognize the injustices that arise in the global context,” as in the case of
medical tourism).
19. See Ryznar, supra note 11, at 1011.
20. See Cynthia B. Cohen, Selling Bits and Pieces of Humans to Make Babies: The Gift
of the Magi Revisited, 24 J. MED. & PHIL. 288, 291 (1999) (“We have no ethical qualms
about selling other materials and procedures that are designed to save lives, such as
respirators, oxygen tanks, intensive care services, and transplant surgery. The reason we
are reluctant to exchange money for human kidneys is that this would deny something
distinctly valuable about human beings—their human dignity and worth.”).
21. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, A Woman’s Worth, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1739, 1769 (2010).
Kimberly Krawiec notes that society tends to stigmatize “virginity sales and other sex
work,” and“romantic[ally] recharacteriz[e] . . . a monetary transaction into an altruistic
one, in the case of oocyte and surrogacy sales,” regardless of the difference in reaction.
Id. She ultimately argues, however, that both reactions are an “attempt to relegate these
taboo trades to the shadows, where they are less overt and thus less destabilizing to
societal norms.” Id. But see Cohen, supra note 20, at 289 (“The sale of fetal eggs and
ovaries strikes many as ethically repulsive.”).
22. See H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., Giving, Selling, and Having Taken: Conflicting
Views of Organ Transfer, 1 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 31, 42 (2004). But see Marsha Garrison,
Regulating Reproduction, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1623, 1648–51 (2008) (suggesting the
use of organ transfer regulation as a model for the regulation of assisted reproductive
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(“WHO”) Guiding Principles on Human Cell, Tissue, and
Organ Transplantation, which prohibit the purchase and sale of
nonreproductive organs for transplantation purposes, explicitly
exempt reproductive organs and tissue from their scope.23 While
a detailed ethical analysis of this dichotomy is beyond the scope
of this Article, it is helpful to recognize that such a divergence of
views may exist. This recognition is particularly useful when
analyzing the regulation of gestational surrogacy in light of
regulation pertaining to other uses of the human body.24
A. Gender and Poverty in Surrogacy
At the outset, many of the concerns surrounding
gestational surrogacy appear to mirror those surrounding sex
work, particularly with regard to gender-based disparities.25 As
with sex work, the surrogacy debate disproportionately impacts
women. In the case of surrogacy, however, the disproportionate
impact is due largely to the biological reality that only women
can be gestational surrogates and that the demand for female
body parts, namely the eggs and womb, cannot be met by any
technology). However, Marsha Garrison also offers an interesting analysis of the
differences between reproductive tissues and nonreproductive tissues and their
treatment in US law, particularly in the context of her arguments in favor of regulating
the industry. Id. at 1651–55; see also Rimm, supra note 6, at 1450 (acknowledging
comparisons between prostitution and surrogacy but noting the “fundamental[]
differen[ce]” in the use of the woman’s body in each scenario).
23. World Health Organization, WHO Guiding Principles on Human Cell, Tissue and
Organ Transplantation, ¶ 4, WHO Doc. EB 123/5 (May 2008) (“The Guiding Principles
do not apply to transplantation of gametes, ovarian or testicular tissue, or embryos for
reproductive purposes, or to blood or blood constituents collected for transfusion
purposes.”).
24. One legal commentator, Margaret Ryznar, noted succinctly: “Interestingly,
while most legal systems around the world have sought to uniformly outlaw or heavily
regulate other markets wherein humans or their parts are bought and sold—including
human trafficking, embryo trafficking, prostitution, and internal organ selling—they
have not yet done so with surrogacy.” Ryznar, supra note 11, at 1011.
25. See, e.g., Donchin, supra note 7, at 324 (discussing issues of gender in the sex
work and surrogacy contexts). But cf. Jean M. Sera, Surrogacy and Prostitution: A
Comparative Analysis, 5 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 315, 316 (1997). Other scholars focus less
explicitly on gender issues and more generally on exploitation concerns. See, e.g.,
Jennifer Damelio & Kelly Sorensen, Enhancing Autonomy in Paid Surrogacy, 22
BIOETHICS 269, 270 (2008) (“The prostitution argument is sensitive in some ways to the
gestational surrogate’s vulnerability; but it’s somewhat off target.”); Rimm, supra note
6, at 1443 (“Opponents of surrogacy liken these arrangements to prostitution, paid
adoptions, or organ sales.”).
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other demographic.26 Lisa Ikemoto, a bioethics and legal
scholar, has articulated her concerns that women would be
systematically underprotected in surrogacy arrangements,
stating that the “interplay between biological essentialism and
commodification of the women who are the means to the end
may permit a laxness in minimizing risk to those women.”27
Indeed, because women tend to be at greater risk of being
marginalized and exploited,28 particularly in conservative or
poverty-stricken societies,29 there is concern that women may be
forced against their will into lives as gestational surrogates.30 In
addition, the lack of meaningful education and employment
opportunities may be a powerful motivation for the provision of
surrogacy services, resulting in women becoming surrogates out
of necessity,31 which could perhaps lead to some women failing
to give truly informed consent.
Furthermore, surrogates may actually reinforce gender
hierarchies in their attempts to resist the stigma associated with
surrogacy.32 For example, some Indian surrogates who were
interviewed about their work reportedly responded with an
“emphasis on the morality of husbands, their ‘generosity’ in
giving permission to their wives to be surrogates, and [a] striking
absence of any narrative about surrogacy as paid work done by
women.”33 In other instances documented in India, surrogates’
families “often spoke of surrogacy not as individual (woman’s)
choice or work, but as a ‘team effort’ made by the entire family

26. See Ikemoto, supra note 7, at 305, 307.
27. Id. at 305.
28. See Donchin, supra note 7, at 325–26 (discussing “the gendered cycle of
vulnerability”); Smerdon, supra note 3, at 54 (“Indian women may be pressured by
their families, brokers, and personal circumstances to lend their bodies for cash.”).
29. See Donchin, supra note 7, at 325–27; Ryznar, supra note 11, at 1011; Rimm,
supra note 6, at 1445.
30. See Pande, supra note 14, at 301–02 (noting that some of the surrogates
justified their decision by arguing that surrogacy was a necessity for them, not a choice
freely made); Iris Leibowitz-Dori, Note, Womb for Rent: The Future of International Trade
in Surrogacy, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 329, 330–31 (1997); see also Donchin, supra note
7, at 326; Ryznar, supra note 11, at 1017; Rimm, supra note 6, at 1444–45.
31. See Leibowitz-Dori, supra note 30, at 331 n.11. One scholar interviewed Indian
surrogates and found that their education level ranged from illiteracy to a high school
level. Their average education level was middle school. See Pande, supra note 14, at 297.
32. Pande, supra note 14, at 303 (discussing Indian surrogates).
33. Id.
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to improve the members’ financial situation.”34 When
interviewed, one father-in-law of a surrogate stated that he had
“decided not to ‘become a surrogate’ again” due to perceived
inequities in pay when “we delivered two babies” but “still we got
the same rate.”35
Poverty is another troubling element of the surrogacy
trade.36 The potentially coercive influence of offering money for
the sale or rental of body parts, services that do not require
existing wealth or education, may create situations in which the
sellers are disproportionately those who have nothing other
than their bodies to sell.37 This risk is apparent in both the sex
work38 and organ trafficking39 contexts. The trends in
international surrogacy appear to support this assumption in the
surrogacy context40 as well. In low-income countries with
permissive regulatory standards or poor enforcement of
surrogacy laws, it thus stands to reason that cottage industries
and “tourist” trades are likely to become prevalent.

34. Id.
35. Id. (emphases added).
36. See id. at 297 (noting that thirty-four of forty-two interviewed surrogates
reported a family income level at or below the poverty line and that “[f]or most women
who work as surrogates, the [US]$3000 earned is equivalent to four or five years of
family income”); Journey to Parenthood, supra note 16 (characterizing surrogates’
earnings of US$5000 as approximately ten years’ worth of income); see also Rimm, supra
note 6, at 1443–46 (examining the dangers of economic exploitation of surrogates).
37. See, e.g., Donchin, supra note 7, at 326 (“Poverty induces people to resort to
work that separates them from their families or jeopardizes their health. These
conditions put pressure on women to become sex workers, surrogates or ovum
donors. . . .”). But see Lee, supra note 8, at 276 (arguing that in the United States the
“prevailing stereotype of [US] women who opt to become gestational surrogates is that
they are motivated primarily by financial considerations, which is not true”).
38. See Gergana Danailova-Trainor & Patrick Belser, Globalization and the Illicit
Market for Human Trafficking: An Empirical Analysis of Supply and Demand 10 (Int’l Lab.
Office, Working Paper No. 53, 2006), available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/
public/—-ed_norm/—-declaration/documents/publication/wcms_081931.pdf; see also
Chi Mgbako & Laura A. Smith, Sex Work and Human Rights in Africa, 33 FORDHAM INT’L
L.J. 1178, 1179 (2010) (“[M]any African sex workers enter the trade due to economic
stressors . . . [which] lead African women to view sex work as an economically viable
option for themselves and their families.”).
39. See Nancy Scheper-Hughes, Organs Without Borders, FOREIGN POL’Y, Jan.–Feb.
2005, at 26; Yosuke Shimazono, The State of the International Organ Trade: A Provisional
Picture Based on Integration of Available Information, 85 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 955,
958–59 (2007).
40. See Pande, supra note 14, at 297 (discussing the relative poverty and lack of
education among surrogates).
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B. Health and Human Dignity
The link between poverty and health is well-documented.41
However, despite their often low socioeconomic status,
surrogates initially are in good health because the provision of
surrogacy services depends on it.42 Furthermore, surrogates tend
to use their earnings to lift their families out of poverty, which
presumably improves their families’ health. As a result, the
general association between poverty and poor health may not be
reflected in an examination of surrogates and their families,
with the possible exception of health-related surrogacy risks,
discussed in detail below. Interestingly, it has been argued that
surrogacy may have a broader negative impact on a destination
country’s public health. For example, some commentators have
raised the possibility that a blossoming surrogacy industry may
drain precious health resources in developing countries.43
Nevertheless, it is likely that many of the risks of surrogacy will
be borne by individual surrogates as a direct result of their work.
1. Potential Negative Impacts
Any time that there is an exchange of money for access to
the body or body parts, there is the risk of harm to human
dignity.44 One risk is that poor women, who comprise a majority
of surrogates, may begin to value themselves as the market
values them—based on age, health history, or any other factors

41. See Allyn L. Taylor & Karen C. Sokol, The Evolution of Global Health Law in a
Globalized World, in 1 THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY: YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE 2007, at 19, 19 (Giuliana Ziccardi Capaldo ed., 2008) (noting that
“income is the primary determinant of health in low income countries”).
42. See Kalsang Bhatia et al., Surrogate Pregnancy: An Essential Guide for Clinicians,
11 OBSTETRICIAN & GYNAECOLOGIST 49, 52 (2009); Lee, supra note 8, at 279 (discussing
a fertility clinic requiring surrogates to be in “good health,” among other
qualifications).
43. See Ikemoto, supra note 7, at 302 (discussing fears of health resources going
into private clinics that service tourists). Similar concerns arise when physicians are
employed to take care of surrogates in the private industry when their skills could be
used to benefit more people by providing basic healthcare in the community. See
Rimm, supra note 6, at 1446 n.108.
44. Some commentators believe that the commodification of the body, even for
reproductive purposes, is so fundamentally incompatible with human dignity that it is
“ethically unacceptable.” See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 20, at 305.
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that cause a surrogate’s “price” to rise or fall.45 Existing cultural
views of women as second-class citizens may further compound
such a skewed sense of self-worth. These cultural views include
practices that treat women as property, such as marital dowries;
deprive them of property, such as unequal or gender-biased
inheritance laws; or view them as burdens who are less valuable
than their male counterparts, such as preferential feeding and
access to education for male children, sex-selective abortion,
and girl-child infanticide.46 Indeed, the very act of serving as a
surrogate may be seen as stigmatizing to the surrogate and her
family.47 Amrita Pande, a gender studies scholar who has
interviewed and conducted ground studies of surrogacy in India,
notes that the commercial or contractual nature of the
surrogate’s relationships with the intended parents makes some
surrogates uncomfortable. In some instances this discomfort
causes surrogates, as a means of protecting their own integrity
and self-worth, to “establish[] or imagin[e] a relationship with
the couple hiring them,” believing in some instances that their
“sisters” (i.e., the intended mothers) would continue to take
care of the surrogates or the surrogates’ families, or would
continue to involve the surrogate in the life of the contracted
child.48 Regardless of the origin or basis for a surrogacy stigma, it
is still a hurdle that the participating parties must overcome.
Many of the physical risks involved in surrogacy are at least
as serious as those involved in other contracted uses of the body,
such as sex work or organ sales.49 Although a surrogate
presumably will not face rape or physical abuse by those involved

45. See Pande, supra note 14, at 305 (discussing one surrogate who believes that
because she is college-educated and not from the Indian state of Gujarat, she has
increased negotiating power and feels “special”).
46. See generally GEETANJALI GANGOLI, INDIAN FEMINISMS: LAW, PATRIARCHIES AND
VIOLENCE IN INDIA (2007) (discussing these cultural views and their impact on reform
in India).
47. See Pande, supra note 14, at 293 (“Women who work as gestational surrogates
in India are engaged in a particularly stigmatized form of labor, and they do
considerable emotional and ideological work to manage that stigma.”). But see Lee,
supra note 8, at 280 (noting one surrogate’s comments that the stigma she faced as a
surrogate was reduced or removed when family and friends saw her financial status
improve as a result of her surrogacy work).
48. Pande, supra note 14, at 306–07.
49. See Bhatia et al., supra note 42, at 52–53 (describing the risks associated with
surrogacy).
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in her contracted pregnancy, she obviously risks damage to her
health, including death, in the scope of her duties. The risks of
pregnancy are well-known, may be life-threatening, and increase
with the number of fetuses in the womb or number of past
pregnancies.50 Even in the “best case scenario”—in which the
pregnancy is uncomplicated and the baby is born healthy and
without the need for cesarean section surgery—the surrogate
will face the pain of labor (or, alternatively, potential
complications from epidural administration), and may face
physiological damage from the birthing process, infection,
negative health effects flowing from pregnancy, such as weight
gain, postpartum depression, and the emotional upheaval51 that
comes with giving to others a child that one has nurtured and
birthed.
Surrogacy also carries with it the challenge of balancing the
interests of the prospective parents with the interests of the
surrogate.52 The interests of the surrogate (e.g., maintaining
personal health, human dignity, and financial interests that can
be met only by delivering a healthy baby) could be at odds with
the interests of the parents (e.g., a financial interest in
minimizing cost53 or a desire to obtain a healthy baby even at the
50. See Susan Donaldson James, Surrogate Mom Damages Heart After Four Babies,
ABC NEWS, Mar. 3, 2011, http://abcnews.go.com/Health/surrogate-mother-suffersheart-damage-giving-birth-children/story?id=13028197.
51. See Bhatia et al., supra note 42, at 52 (suggesting counseling so that, among
other things, the surrogate can consider anticipate the emotional “effect of parting
with the child if the pregnancy is successful”); Lee, supra note 8, at 290. But see Bhatia
et al., supra note 42, at 52–53 (noting that theoretical concerns about the postpartum
mental health of the surrogate have not been borne out in clinical practice).
52. Certainly, any child born via surrogacy also will be impacted by the parameters
of the surrogacy arrangement. See, e.g., Ikemoto, supra note 7, at 294 (discussing the
risks that arise from legal uncertainty over the parent-child relationships formed from
the use of assisted reproductive technology, and noting that “[t]he child's status and
future” also hinge on the outcome of such an issue); Ryznar, supra note 11, at 1031–35.
However, the extent to which an unborn fetus has separate and protectable interests is
less clear. See Knoppers, supra note 4, at 341 (noting the lack of “legal personality” of
an embryo in vitro).
53. Craig R. Sweet, Surrogacy: Practical Medical Aspects, AM. SURROGACY CENTER,
INC., http://www.surrogacy.com/medres/article/aspects.html (last visited Feb. 20,
2012) (listing the potential unexpected costs associated with surrogacy:
Pregnancy complications costs; maternal complications; fetal complications
such as multiple pregnancy complications; [c]osts for uterine evacuation
procedures for spontaneous pregnancy losses; [c]osts for selective reduction
in multi-fetal pregnancies; [c]osts for genetic amniocentesis; [c]osts for
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expense of the health of the surrogate).54 While the abstract
notion of making surrogates “disposable”55 may be abhorrent,
the truth of the matter is that there will be complications
resulting from some of the pregnancies,56 and difficult decisions
will have to be made about whose interests should be protected.
2. Potential Positive Impacts
Surrogacy is perhaps unique among contracted uses of the
body in terms of the quality of health care a service provider can
expect to receive. In fact, it is in the interest of the prospective
parents to protect the health of the surrogate, because it
increases the likelihood of delivering a healthy child.57
Therefore, unless there is a direct conflict between the health of
the surrogate and the health of the baby—or, as perhaps may be
more likely, a question of expensive and excellent medical care
versus cheap and merely good or adequate medical care—
surrogates are more likely than, for example, sex workers to
have their health needs respected and even promoted by their
clients.58 This, indeed, is one of the ways gestational surrogacy
may be beneficial for surrogates: despite the risks they
undertake by agreeing to carry and deliver a child, they at least
are likely to receive a level of medical care higher than the level
of care their nonsurrogate peers receive.59
termination of a genetically abnormal pregnancy (rare); [o]ngoing
psychologic [sic] counseling costs; [m]edical complication costs (rare)).
54. For a discussion of health-related conflicts of interests between gestational
surrogate mother and the egg donor mother, see Bhatia et al., supra note 42, at 53. But
see Rimm, supra note 6, at 1455–56 (acknowledging the limitations on the ability of
commissioning parents to compel surrogates to make decisions in her interests at the
expense of the baby).
55. See Pande, supra note 14, at 304.
56. Usha Rengachary Smerdon suggests that the risk of complications may
increase due to the lack of genetic relationship between surrogate and fetus. See
Smerdon, supra note 3, at 54.
57. See Humbyrd, supra note 18, at 118 (arguing that “the best interests of the
child and prospective parents match the well-being of the surrogate mother during
pregnancy”); Rimm, supra note 6, at 1456 (noting the argument that the
“commissioning couple’s interests are aligned with the surrogate’s own,” including
protecting her mental and physical health).
58. See Sera, supra note 25, at 332.
59. See Pande, supra note 14, at 296 (observing that “most surrogates [the
commentator saw] stayed under constant medical supervision during the last six
months of their pregnancies”).

2012]

GESTATIONAL SURROGACY DEBATE

677

Furthermore, some argue that women’s ability to be
surrogates and to be paid handsomely for their service may
actually increase the surrogate’s feelings of control and selfworth, while at the same raising the status of childbearing as a
valued and respected process.60 In her studies, Amrita Pande
interviewed a married, college-educated surrogate who clearly
felt special and empowered by her role as a surrogate: she
proudly described her desirability as a surrogate in the eyes of
clients, and emphasized that it was she who was doing the work,
she who would decide what to do with the money, and she who
would decide whether a couple who “wanted [her]” was
deserving of her services.61 Indeed, Pande found that “for some
surrogates, the narrative of ‘being special’ [because of
desirability as a surrogate] did more than just counter the stigma
of being disposable mothers; it also encouraged them to take
care of their health and think of their own needs.”62 Pande
rightly observed:
This ‘I am special’ narrative is particularly powerful when
invoked by lower-class women in India, a country where sexselective abortions, skewed sex ratios at birth, and high
female infanticide and mortality present compelling
evidence of the prevalence of son preference . . . . Being
‘special’ increases the women’s feelings of self-worth.63

Additionally, some view surrogacy as a form of mutual
assistance—two or more people helping each other to obtain
what alone none of them could have obtained: a child for one
and a better life for the other.64 While commercial gestational
60. See, e.g., Sera, supra note 25, at 332–33.
61. See Pande, supra note 14, at 304–06.
62. Id. at 306.
63. Id. at 305.
64. See Journey to Parenthood, supra note 16 (reporting that a purchaser of
surrogacy services in India stated:
You have not walked in my shoes as someone who cannot have a
child . . . . And you don’t know how it feels to not be able to pay for your
children to go to school, to not be able to . . . take care of your
family. . . . And we were able to come together, [the surrogate] and I, and
give each other a life that neither of us could achieve on our own. And I just
don’t see what’s wrong with that);
see also Sera, supra note 25, at 332–33 (arguing that the surrogate “gives the gift of a
child” while at the same time earning money, and noting “the inherent benefit of two
persons from different worlds meeting in order to strike a bargain, in that both women
can learn from each other”).
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surrogacy may not be attributed with the same level of altruism
as, for example, a woman carrying a child for her infertile sister
for free,65 there is nonetheless an argument that surrogacy is a
unique service that permits the surrogate to be honored for her
work, and to enjoy the feeling of having helped another family.66
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW IN REGULATING GESTATIONAL
SURROGACY
It is clear that surrogacy rapidly is becoming a truly
globalized enterprise, with all the concomitant risks of disparate
impacts on different countries. In fact, it is precisely because
there are differing standards in different countries—leading to
concerns about tourism and exploitation of low-income
populations in particular—that many have called for
international decisionmakers to become involved in the
regulation of this industry.67 Indeed, the Special Commission on
the Practical Operation of the Hague Convention of 29 May
1993 on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of
Intercountry Adoption noted the increasing incidence of
international surrogacy arrangements and “recommended that
the Hague Conference should carry out further study of the
legal, especially private international law, issues surrounding
international surrogacy.”68 However, as discussed in Part I,
65. See Clark, supra note 2, at 770.
66. See Sera, supra note 25, at 332–33.
67. See, e.g., Humbyrd, supra note 18, at 116–18 (discussing the implementation of
fair trade principles at the international level for surrogacy regulation); Katarina
Trimmings & Paul Beaumont, International Surrogacy Arrangements: An Urgent Need for
Legal Regulation at the International Level, 7 J. PRIVATE INT’L L. 627, 633 (2011) (“It has
been widely recognised that there is an urgent need for a multilateral, legally binding
instrument that would establish a global, coherent and ethical practice of international
surrogacy.”); Leibowitz-Dori, supra note 30, at 352 (identifying the Hague Convention
on Intercountry Adoption as an instrument in which surrogacy should be included by
“minor modifications in interpretation” involving existing language pertaining to
adoption and trafficking in children); Rimm, supra note 6, at 1445 n.102 (citing
Leibowitz-Dori). See generally Lee, supra note 8 (describing the lack of uniformity in
international surrogacy regulation).
68. Special Commission on the Practical Operation of the Hague Convention of
29 May 1993 on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry
Adoption, June 17–25, 2010, Conclusions and Recommendations Adopted by the Special
Commission,
¶¶
25–26,
available
at
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/
adop2010concl_e.pdf; see Lauren Jade Martin, Reproductive Tourism in the Age of
Globalization, 6 GLOBALIZATIONS 249, 260 (2009) (suggesting international surrogacy
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ethical views on the subject of gestational surrogacy vary, and
countries have differing views on the proper substantive content
of surrogacy laws.69 For that reason, it seems that international
regulation of gestational surrogacy is unlikely to occur at the
present juncture.70
In an attempt to fill surrogacy’s regulatory gap, some
commentators have identified existing international instruments
or legal frameworks that may be used to govern surrogacy.71
Many argue that a separate instrument72—preferably with a
human rights-based framework,73 erring on the side of
standard-setting based on the Hague Convention on the Protection of Children and
Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption); Trimmings & Beaumont, supra
note 67, at 636–38 (describing a convention on international surrogacy based on the
1993 Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of
Intercountry Adoption).
69. See, e.g., Smerdon, supra note 3, at 24–25 (discussing different regulatory
standards for surrogacy in different countries).
70. See, e.g., Leibowitz-Dori, supra note 30, at 350; McEwen, supra note 18, at 297.
But see Trimmings & Beaumont, supra note 67, at 635 (cautioning against an attempt to
unify substantive rules and instead advocating for a flexible framework agreement).
71. See, e.g., Knoppers, supra note 4, at 358 (discussing the addition of “new
provisions to existing international human rights covenants” for human genetic or
reproductive material); McEwen, supra note 18, at 298–304 (discussing the potential
basis for regulation under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination, the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, the Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multilateral Enterprises
and Social Policy, the Declaration Concerning the Aims and Purposes of the
International Labour Organization, and the Hague Convention on Intercountry
Adoption); Rimm, supra note 6, at 1453–62 (arguing for a labor rights “lens” through
which surrogacy regulation should be approached; note, however, that it is not clear
whether she limits her argument to advocating for a labor rights framework for India’s
domestic law—as her arguments are made in the broader context of analyzing Indian
guidelines and proposed legislation—or whether she advocates such a legal backdrop
for international treatment of surrogacy as a matter of principle).
72. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 68, at 260–61; Trimmings & Beaumont, supra note
67, at 635–46 (calling for and outlining a proposed convention on gestational
surrogacy); Leibowitz-Dori, supra note 30, at 354; Brock A. Patton, Note, Buying a
Newborn: Globalization and the Lack of Federal Regulation of Commercial Surrogacy Contracts,
79 UMKC L. REV. 507, 529–30 (2010) (noting that the lack of international regulation
presents challenges and suggesting that a comprehensive US federal law or system of
laws on the subject could be the basis for an international treaty).
73. See, e.g., Leibowitz-Dori, supra note 30, at 346–49 (discussing the right to
privacy in making decisions about reproduction, the right to procreate, both for the
self and “for the benefit of others,” and the right to make decisions about the number
and spacing of children, the latter as articulated in the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women); Emily Stehr, Note, International
Surrogacy Contract Regulation: National Governments’ and International Bodies’ Misguided
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protecting the surrogate over the contracting parents,74 and
having the utmost regard for the children born of the surrogacy
arrangement75—would be the ideal solution.
Reform efforts should strive for this outcome, but
realistically it is unlikely to be achieved. This is due not only to
the documented lack of consensus regarding substantive legal
approaches to surrogacy, but also to the complexity of
surrogacy.76 Surrogacy requires regulation in so many areas of
law that any comprehensive single instrument will be unlikely to
achieve the necessary political support. The Sections that follow
discuss more narrowly-focused regulatory alternatives and offer
an analysis of the political feasibility, the substantive effects, and
the efficacy of the regulatory scheme in achieving its goals when
using trade- and labor-focused international organization
platforms as alternatives to an all-encompassing instrument that,

Quests to Prevent Exploitation, 35 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 253, 286–87 (2012).
Iris Leibowitz-Dori argues that procreative liberty best protects surrogates’ interests. See
Leibowitz-Dori, supra note 30, at 346. She also posits that the surrogate must not be
denied the opportunity to change her mind and keep the child, although this may be
going a step too far in ignoring the interests of the contracting parents. Id. at 349.
Indeed, a legal definition of “parent” that eliminates this conundrum (noted in the
discussion infra Part III.A) would foreclose potential conflicts on the subject as a matter
of law.
74. See id. at 345 (“Although the intent behind prohibition (i.e., protecting parties
from potential abuses) is laudable, it can be satisfied more effectively by improving the
bargaining position of the exploited person.”); see also id. at 346–49 (providing an
excellent discussion of examples of ways in which the surrogates’ rights should receive
primary protection, including at virtually every decision point). See generally Ryznar,
supra note 11 (arguing that an international framework should be child- and womancentric).
75. See Clark, supra note 2, at 777 (“The primary objectives of any legislation on
surrogacy should be, first, the protection of children from being treated as
commodities regardless of their interests, and, secondly, the protection of women from
being forced to surrender their children against their wishes.”); see also Smerdon, supra
note 3, at 59–62 (discussing issues pertaining to the children born of surrogacy
arrangements, particularly with respect to concerns about commodification). See
generally Ryznar, supra note 11 (arguing that an international framework should be
child- and woman-centric).
76. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. The type of regulatory convention
proposed by Katarina Trimmings and Paul Beaumont also may be a reasonable
alternative legal framework. However, an analysis of their proposal is outside the scope
of this Article, as the Article compares the utility and feasibility of a broad-based
substantive agreement with a more narrowly-focused substantive agreement under the
auspices of either the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) or the International Labour
Organization (“ILO”). See generally Trimmings & Beaumont, supra note 67.
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ideally, would be created under the auspices of the United
Nations General Assembly.
A. Substantive Challenges to Regulation
For countries that lack substantive surrogacy regulation,
concerns have been raised about the perils of such an industry
being left to self-regulate.77 Some argue that regulation of
surrogacy would help protect against abuses of surrogates (or,
indeed, the children born of surrogate arrangements) by
“limit[ing] profiteering activities by surrogacy intermediaries,”
thereby “shift[ing] the return of profits to the surrogate mother
rather than to various agents.”78 In fact, legalized surrogacy has
been described as a form of wealth redistribution, flowing from
rich childless couples to disadvantaged surrogates.79 Explicitly
legalizing and regulating surrogacy would enable surrogates to
solidify their contract rights to be compensated, thus giving
disadvantaged and uneducated women a way to earn a good
income, while simultaneously reinforcing the surrogates’
autonomy to make decisions about their own bodies.80
Furthermore, at an international level, regulation—if properly
structured so as to be most effective—would have the
77. See, e.g., Humbyrd, supra note 18, at 116 (“Similarly, international surrogacy is
currently a laissez-faire or free trade system, and surrogacy arrangements are likely to
benefit the healthcare providers, surrogacy agencies, and prospective parents at the
expense of the surrogate mothers and their communities. This absence of regulation
nearly ensures that a surrogate mother in a poor country has been underpaid and thus
exploited by wealthier individuals.”); Lee, supra note 8, at 281–83.
78. E.g., Leibowitz-Dori, supra note 30, at 342; see also Todd M. Krim, Beyond Baby
M: International Perspectives on Gestational Surrogacy and the Demise of the Unitary Biological
Mother, 5 ANNALS HEALTH L. 193, 220–21 (1996) (discussing the case of a man
intending to run a “baby farm” with Eastern European surrogates, and stating: “As
more individuals learn that gestational surrogacy can become a profitable investment,
the industry could grow at an alarming rate without proper oversight. This unexpected
and uncontrolled growth in the industry could lead to another significant problem: the
exploitation and commercialization of women”); Rimm, supra note 6, at 1457.
79. See, e.g., Leibowitz-Dori, supra note 30, at 342.
80. See id. This reasoning parallels that which is advanced by supporters of
legalizing sex work. See, e.g., Victoria Hayes, Prostitution Policies and Sex Trafficking:
Assessing the Use of Prostitution-Based Polices as Tools for Combating Sex Trafficking
(Fall 2008) (unpublished paper) (on file with Chicago-Kent College of Law), available
at www.kentlaw.edu/perritt/courses/seminar/VHayes-final-IRPaper.pdf (providing a
thorough discussion of the debate regarding decriminalization, legalization, and
criminalization of prostitution, along with philosophies and theories driving those
policy choices).

682 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:665
opportunity to ensure that the global surrogacy industry
operates on an even plane, thus reducing the possibility of
exploitation due to the tourist trades.81 International regulation
is a uniquely valuable tool for combating truly international
problems encountered when moving from one country to
another with a surrogate or with a child born of a surrogacy
arrangement.82
A comprehensive surrogacy regulatory scheme would
impact several different areas of law, both domestic and
international.83 Such a scheme would implicate issues of family
law, such as determinations of parenthood84 and child custody,85
questions of default parental responsibility,86 and the boundaries
of child welfare arrangements.87 Because of the international
nature of the surrogacy industry, laws pertaining to adoption
and child abduction88 also would have to be considered, along
with immigration and citizenship laws (which are particularly

81. See supra note 67 and accompanying text; see also Humbyrd, supra note 18, at
116–18 (arguing that a “fair trade” approach to surrogacy would help ensure benefits
to all parties and remove the potential for exploitation); Krim, supra note 78, at 226
(“Eventually, the United States must work with other countries to develop an
international code of ethics to safeguard the use of [in vitro fertilization] and related
technologies. As long as one country allows for unregulated surrogacy, the threat of
baby trafficking and exploitation of women will exist.”).
82. See Krim, supra note 78, at 219–20 (discussing choice of law problems in
international surrogacy arrangements); Lee, supra note 8, at 285–86 (providing a reallife example of such a problem).
83. See Knoppers, supra note 4, at 346, 350–56 (discussing the various issues of
human rights law impacting the “status, protection and uses of, and access to, human
genetic material”).
84. See Ikemoto, supra note 7, at 294; Leibowitz-Dori, supra note 30, at 337 n.50.
85. See Weldon E. Havins & James J. Dalessio, Reproductive Surrogacy at the
Millennium: Proposed Model Legislation Regulating “Non-Traditional” Gestational Surrogacy
Contracts, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 673, 678–79 (2000) (discussing a US case in which
state law “provide[d] that a child born to a married woman living with her husband is a
presumed child of the (surrogate’s) marriage” and detailing the custody issues that
ensued); see also Lee, supra note 8, at 276–77, 285–86 (addressing possible international
ramifications of the parentage determination).
86. See Veronica English et al., Ethics Briefings, 28 J. MED. ETHICS 205, 205 (2002).
87. See Lee, supra note 7, at 291–92 (describing an unfit parent who had
commissioned the birth of twins and the resulting issues surrounding it, particularly
given the differences between US state laws).
88. See English et al., supra note 86, at 205 (explaining child abduction and
international law related to adoption); see also Lee, supra note 8, at 287, 291–92
(relating adoption laws to surrogacy regulation schemes); Leibowitz-Dori, supra note
30, at 330–37 (discussing adoption and international law).
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significant for a global surrogacy industry).89 Furthermore, a
comprehensive instrument would have to assess cross-cutting
legal frameworks, such as those pertaining to abortion,90
contracts (particularly regarding the conscionability and
enforceability of contracts for children or access to the body),91
trade (especially trade in services),92 labor,93 property
(particularly regarding ownership of embryos),94 healthcare,95
and substantive human rights (e.g., in defining and applying
rights to reproductive and sexual freedom).96 Resolution of
these issues at the international level would help ensure that
both surrogates and contracting parents know their rights and
responsibilities and are protected to the extent that the
international community believes they need to be protected.97 It

89. See Smerdon, supra note 3, at 62–81; Lee, supra note 8, at 285–86.
90. See Leibowitz-Dori, supra note 30, at 348–49.
91. See Havins & Dalessio, supra note 85, at 675–87 (detailing US state laws and
legal cases pertaining to surrogacy); see also Clark, supra note 2, at 776–77 (criticizing
the enforceability requirement of a draft South African surrogacy law and arguing that
the “interests of the surrogate demand that she be given a breathing space to decide
whether to go through with the contract”).
92. See Christina Stephenson, Reproductive Outsourcing to India: WTO Obligations in
the Absence of US National Legislation, 43 J. WORLD TRADE 189, 195–97 (2009).
93. See Pande, supra note 14, at 293 (arguing that commercial surrogacy is a form
of labor); Rimm, supra note 6, at 1450, 1453 (noting the comparison between surrogacy
and other contracts for services, and advocating for a labor rights framework); see also
infra notes 137–38 and accompanying text.
94. See R. Alta Charo, Children by Choice: Reproductive Technologies and the Boundaries
of Personal Autonomy, 4 NATURE CELL BIOLOGY (FERTILITY SUPP.) s23, s24 (2002); see also
Knoppers, supra note 4, at 343–45 (arguing that determinations about human genetic
material’s “qualification as person or property” must be made before laws can be
enacted on the subject).
95. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 8, at 296–97 (noting that Israel’s public healthcare
system provides care for surrogates).
96. See Knoppers, supra note 4, at 351–56 (discussing the right to marry and found
a family under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
and the rights to life, privacy, and health under international law in the context of
human genetic material); Lee, supra note 8, at 287 (noting the UK’s prohibition on
surrogacy for “homosexual couples of either gender, non-married heterosexual
couples, and single persons”).
97. See Humbyrd, supra note 18, at 116; Eileen Smith-Cavros, Fertility and Inequality
Across Borders: Assisted Reproductive Technology and Globalization, 4 SOC. COMPASS 466, 474
(2010) (noting that “[t]otal lack of regulation, however, can lead to abuse and
negatively affect egg donors, surrogates, and traveling patients”); Patton, supra note 72,
at 522, 529 (stating that where jurisdictions lack surrogacy regulation, the result is a
“less predictable outcome for the parties involved in . . . custody disputes”); see also
Patton, supra note 72, at 526 (“First, the lack of regulation may lead to the exploitation
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also would ensure that any child born of these arrangements
(who did not consent, but nonetheless may suffer the greatest
impacts of all) is protected.98 Such a comprehensive approach to
surrogacy is necessary to avoid difficult questions that, frankly,
would remain unanswered otherwise, leaving the parties with
high levels of risk and no recourse if problems arise.
It is unlikely that enough countries will reach a consensus
on all these issues to make an international surrogacy
instrument possible in the near future. The challenges do not,
however, end there. Even assuming an international consensus
is achieved, decisionmakers still would have to defend their
decisions to the citizens of their home countries. Furthermore,
there is a high probability that a comprehensive international
instrument would conflict—somewhere, at some point—with an
existing body of domestic law. Broad reform of domestic law
would be unlikely, however, given the many different areas of
law implicated and the possibility for political backlash.
In the face of such challenges, countries may be unwilling
to cede the national autonomy necessary to arrive at a
comprehensive international instrument. In addition,
commentators have raised concerns about certain countries’
actions effectively controlling international organizations.99
Thus, a large, influential country may derail instrument creation
efforts by either refusing to sign such a broad international
instrument, or by hesitating to adjust its domestic laws to protect
surrogates in other countries, particularly if it felt it already was
protecting surrogates within its own borders. Even with a
comprehensive international instrument, there would remain a
reasonable risk of noncompliance by individual surrogacy
operations within countries, especially in countries with limited
capacity for, or desire to, monitor and enforce the treaty.
Given the serious risks to health and human rights that
international gestational surrogacy could entail, the efficacy of

of surrogate mothers. With no legal or regulatory framework in place to protect them,
surrogate mothers are subject to the demands of contracting couples willing to pay.”).
98. See Ryznar, supra note 11, at 1035 (stating that regulation of surrogacy should
take place keeping in mind the interests of the children involved).
99. See, e.g., JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 642
(2005); see also Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in International Agreements, 99 AM. J.
INT’L L. 581, 584 n.31 (2005).
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any applicable international instrument in protecting health
and human rights is more important than even technical
“compliance.”100 A comprehensive surrogacy instrument would
have to cover so many issues that, in order to achieve agreement
from all parties, the instrument probably would have very low
legal standards with few meaningful protections in place.101
Therefore, countries may be able to be in technical compliance,
but to no effective avail—that is, the aforementioned surrogacyrelated harms would still occur.102 This raises further concerns
about the potential international political and monetary capital
that would be spent to produce a relatively toothless instrument.
Once the international community has been moved to act on
the surrogacy issue, it may be unlikely to do so again, and so an
ineffective international instrument also may act as a barrier to
future corrective action.
With those concerns in mind, and in light of the academic
discussion regarding the desirability of using different
frameworks (particularly trade and labor) to approach surrogacy
regulation, this Article now examines the feasibility of a more
narrowly-focused instrument that could be created under either
of two international lawmaking platforms: the World Trade
Organization (“WTO”)103 or the International Labour
Organization (“ILO”).104 As “[international organizations] do
not aspire to achieve the same things,”105 it makes sense that the
use of different international organization platforms will result
in varying levels of protection to the interested parties in the

100. See Smerdon, supra note 3, at 82 (questioning whether international
regulation of surrogacy could be effective, or at least more so than an outright ban); id.
at 82 n.402 (quoting another scholar who expressed the view that human rights-based
instruments are generally focused on articulating ideals rather than being truly
effective).
101. See Raustiala, supra note 99, at 610 (discussing the relationship between
efficacy and compliance).
102. See id.
103. While some commentators have made observations regarding the utility and
biases of the WTO, in particular, see Stephenson, supra note 92, at 195–208, this Article
offers additional commentary regarding the feasibility of creating a new, human-rightsrelated surrogacy instrument under its auspices.
104. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (noting that some commentators
have suggested regulating surrogacy in the context of labor, and highlighting the
potential role of the ILO).
105. ALVAREZ, supra note 99, at 7.
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surrogacy debate.106 The challenges to these approaches include
(1) a lack of political will to push the boundaries of instrument
creation into the surrogacy arena, and (2) a high risk of an
imbalance in the protection given to various parties to a
surrogacy arrangement. Both challenges ultimately derive from
these two organizations’ limited scope.107
B. Building Consensus at the International Level
As noted previously, the major challenge to the creation
and adoption of an international surrogacy instrument is the
lack of international consensus regarding the ethical and legal
issues raised by surrogacy. Particularly for issues that involve
human rights, such as surrogacy, the results of international
“audits” and supervision on those subjects (which may be used
as a tool to improve compliance108) may serve as useful fodder
for international discussion on the subject of human rights
boundaries in the surrogacy trade.109 Indeed, at least one
commentator has noted that one “function served by state
reporting is to assist state parties in implementing international
106. This is due, in part, to the substantive limitations of the platforms (i.e., the
areas of law in which they have influence). Advocates for particular frameworks
necessarily argue that the framework in question will succeed in protecting whichever
party they believe deserves the highest level of protection, usually surrogates or
children. See, e.g., Humbyrd, supra note 18, at 116–18 (highlighting how “fair trade”
regulations could protect the surrogate by limiting “mutually advantageous
exploitation”); Rimm, supra note 6, at 1453–54 (discussing the impact of a labor rights
framework on surrogate protection in particular and positing that such an approach
has the potential to decrease surrogate exploitation); see also supra notes 74–75 and
accompanying text (arguing that any stand-alone international agreement on surrogacy
should protect the surrogate and the child).
107. But see ALVAREZ, supra note 99, at 12–13 (calling it “shortsighted” to view
certain organizations as “contributing only” to the substantive thrust of their charter).
108. Allyn L. Taylor, Globalization and Biotechnology: UNESCO and an International
Strategy to Advance Human Rights and Public Health, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 479, 519 (1999).
Allyn Taylor touts the use of such measures by the ILO: “The effectiveness of the ILO,
especially in its earlier years, in utilizing supervisory mechanisms to implement
international standards has been widely recognized, and the ILO’s supervisory
procedures are still generally viewed as a model for the UN system.” Id. at 517–18.
109. See id. at 531 (similarly noting that, for international instruments pertaining
to the human genome, “[i]n promoting an auditing process for the [Universal
Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights], [the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization] may well be able to enlist the
political assistance of countries and regions that recognize the critical importance of
harmonization of norms in this realm”).

2012]

GESTATIONAL SURROGACY DEBATE

687

commitments by triggering international assistance to solve
domestic problems identified during the reporting process.”110
By this mechanism, then, surrogacy, which usually is addressed
at the domestic level, could find itself the subject of
international publicity and, consequentially, international
debate.
Nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”) with human
rights or women’s rights platforms also may serve as catalysts for
international consensus building at the international
organizations that permit NGO involvement. Even where NGOs
are unable to participate directly in international organizations,
they nevertheless may have sufficient influence to raise the level
of international discussion on the subject.111 The only challenge
is ensuring that, once the institutional mechanisms for
generating discussion have been used, the member countries
are able to reach the level of consensus needed to create a
meaningful instrument on the subject of surrogacy.112

110. Id. at 524.
111. See generally Cenap Çakmak, The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations
(NGOs) in the Norm Creation Process in the Field of Human Rights, 3 ALTERNATIVES:
TURKISH J. INT’L REL. 100 (2004) (discussing the influence of nongovernmental
organizations in the creation and implementation of human rights-related
international instruments).
112. For example, during discussions on the United Nations Declaration Against
Human Cloning, a deep conflict developed between governments wishing to ban all
forms of cloning and those that wished only to ban reproductive cloning but permit
therapeutic cloning. See Allyn L. Taylor, Governing the Globalization of Public Health, 32
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 500, 504 (2004) (stating that the negotiation process was “stymied
by a split between those states . . . that favor[ed] a broad-based cloning treaty that bans
all human cloning, including therapeutic cloning, and those states that favor[ed] a
treaty with a narrow focus on human reproductive cloning”). Compare Working Group
of the Sixth Committee, 59th Sess., International Convention Against Human Cloning,
¶¶ 2–3, A/C.6/59/L.2 (Sept. 29, 2004) (establishing a draft resolution on human
cloning that would seek to impose a global ban on the cloning of human embryos,
regardless of purpose), with Working Group of the Sixth Committee, 59th Sess.,
International Convention Against the Reproductive Cloning of Human Beings, ¶ 2,
A/C.6/59/L.8 (Oct. 6, 2004) (calling for an international ban on human reproductive
cloning but permitting cloning for “therapeutic” purposes). These negotiations
ultimately resulted in the Declaration Against Human Cloning, although “it is widely
recognized that adoption of the Declaration does not indicate that any meaningful
consensus has been reached.” Timothy Caulfield & Barbara von Tigerstrom,
Globalization and Biotechnology Policy: The Challenges Created by Gene Patents and Cloning
Technologies, in 27 GLOBALIZATION AND HEALTH: CHALLENGES FOR HEALTH LAW AND
BIOETHICS 129, 140 (Belinda Bennett & George F. Tomossy eds., 2006) (citation
omitted).
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IV. POTENTIAL LAWMAKING RUBRICS AND PLATFORMS
A. Trade
When one thinks of a truly international set of standards
that may be enforced between and among participating nations,
the system of international trade laws springs quickly to mind.
The WTO is the premier intergovernmental organization for
issues of international trade. It is structured so that members
must accept all so-called WTO-covered agreements as a single
undertaking.113 In other words, countries are not permitted to
be selective about which trade-related agreements they are
bound to honor. Furthermore, and perhaps most significantly,
the WTO is well-known for its unusual authority to enforce the
agreements within its purview. If one member state believes that
another member state has violated a WTO-covered agreement,
the offended member may lodge a complaint against the
offending member, setting in motion a process of dispute
resolution that includes formal consultations between the
parties, an initial decision by a reviewing panel, and potentially a
decision by the appellate body on appeal.114 The outcome of this
process binds the parties, and sanctions may be harsh.
As a general rule, WTO-covered agreements are designed
to implement principles such as lowering barriers to trade,
ensuring equal access to markets by treating all member
countries equally, and permitting free market economies to
operate unfettered by unnecessary intrusion.115 While many
WTO-covered agreements pertain to trade in goods, the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”) has a different focus,
113. See Frequently Asked Questions About TRIPS in the WTO, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/tripfq_e.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2012)
(explaining the structure under which states operate in the WTO).
114. See generally Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU] (laying out the
dispute resolution procedure).
115. See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, pmbl., Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 14. A notable exception is the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”), which
requires that all countries put in place certain substantive laws designed to ensure
protection of intellectual property. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS].
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and “distinguishes between four modes of supplying services:
cross-border trade, consumption abroad, commercial presence,
and presence of natural persons.”116 The GATS
was inspired by essentially the same objectives as its
counterpart in merchandise trade, the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade []: creating a credible and reliable
system of international trade rules; ensuring fair and
equitable treatment of all participants (principle of nondiscrimination); stimulating economic activity through
guaranteed policy bindings; and promoting trade and
development through progressive liberalization.117

In fact, at least one commentator has argued that
commercial gestational surrogacy may be seen as a “service”
such that the GATS could be applied to it in instances of “crossborder surrogacy agreements.”118 This raises the issue of having
“Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment” for services—in other words,
ensuring that Country A has to give suppliers of surrogacy
services from Country B treatment “no less favourable” than that
offered to Country A’s own surrogacy service providers.119 This
would result in a lowering of barriers to the surrogacy service
industry, which would run the risk of benefitting the
commissioning parents at the expense of the service providers—
an unacceptable outcome in and of itself, according to many
commentators.120 However, “[i]f we are genuinely concerned

116. The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS): Objectives, Coverage and
Disciplines, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/
gatsqa_e.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2012).
117. Id.
118. Stephenson, supra note 92, at 190. Christina Stephenson focuses specifically
on US obligations and the challenges created by differing state standards for surrogacy.
See id. Jennifer Rimm also notes, without reference to the WTO or trade law per se, that
“[s]upporters of legalized commercial surrogacy argue that surrogacy contracts are less
like prostitution and more like other service contracts that individuals enter into for
purely financial reasons.” Rimm, supra note 6, at 1450.
119. See Stephenson, supra note 92, at 202–03.
120. See Clark, supra note 2, at 777 (“The primary objectives of any legislation on
surrogacy should be, first, the protection of children from being treated as
commodities . . . and, secondly, the protection of women from being forced to
surrender their children against their wishes.”); Leibowitz-Dori, supra note 30, at 341
(“[S]urrogacy . . . should be regulated to protect women and children.”); see also
Humbyrd, supra note 18, at 116 (noting that the free trade system benefits other parties
at the expense of surrogates, and suggesting the use of “fair trade” principles to correct
the imbalance).
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about the exploitation of women, then a policy of nonencouragement in regard to surrogacy would seem to be
desirable.”121
Nevertheless, given the increasing discussion of “mission
creep” in international organizations, particularly with regard to
the insertion of human rights principles into discussions in
previously unrelated platforms,122 one wonders whether the
creation of a WTO-covered agreement relating to surrogacy
services could be a viable alternative option to a broad-based
United Nations undertaking. After all, the Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”) is
universally recognized as an anomaly in the general system of
WTO-covered agreements because of its requirement that WTO
members enact domestic laws with minimum standards for
intellectual property protection.123 TRIPS nevertheless remains
one of the most powerful WTO-covered agreements, albeit one
of the most controversial, ostensibly due to its impacts on access
to medicines,124 and is enforceable under WTO dispute
121. Clark, supra note 2, at 777; see also Krim, supra note 78, at 221 (warning of the
dangers of “uncontrolled growth” of international surrogacy in the absence of “proper
oversight”).
122. See Jagdish Bhagwati, After Seattle: Free Trade and the WTO, 77 INT’L AFF. 15,
24–25 (2001) (arguing that the WTO is “at risk” from nongovernmental organizations
pushing the WTO to include a human rights agenda). See generally Boyan Konstantinov,
Human Rights and the WTO: Are They Really Oil and Water?, 43 J. WORLD TRADE 317
(2009) (discussing the relationship between the WTO and human rights); Gudrun
Monika Zagel, WTO & Human Rights: Examining Linkages and Suggesting Convergence, 2
IDLO VOICES DEV. JURISTS 1 (2005).
123. See Rachel Brewster, The Surprising Benefits to Developing Countries of Linking
International Trade and Intellectual Property, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 11, 19–26 (2011);
Frequently Asked Questions About TRIPS in the WTO, supra note 111 (“[T]he TRIPS
Agreement requires members to comply with certain minimum standards for the
protection of intellectual property rights covered in it.”); see also TRIPS art. 1(1)
(establishing a floor, but not a ceiling, for domestic international property rights in
each member state).
124. See Brewster, supra note 123, at 2–3 (arguing that TRIPS is “controversial”
but has “actually provided developing countries with some benefits”); Thomas Pogge,
Access to Medicines, 1 PUB. HEALTH ETHICS 73, 75–76 (2008) (“The TRIPS Agreement
and its imposition are plainly unjust and will, in terms of the magnitude of harm
caused, number among the largest human rights violations in history.”); Alan O. Sykes,
TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals, Developing Countries, and the Doha “Solution,” 3 CHI. J. INT’L L.
47, 49, 65–68 (2002) (arguing that TRIPS actually provides incentives for the
development of drugs to treat diseases such as malaria). See generally OXFAM INT’L,
PRICED OUT OF REACH: HOW WTO PATENT POLICIES WILL REDUCE ACCESS TO
MEDICINES IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD (2001), available at www.oxfam.org.uk/
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resolution mechanisms.125 We might therefore envision a
surrogacy service instrument that, similar to TRIPS, contains
requirements for enactment of surrogacy-specific domestic laws.
The usual concerns about free trade principles (i.e., lower
regulatory barriers) creating a “race to the bottom”126 would
dissolve because of the standard-setting requirement.127 Due to
its WTO-covered status, such an agreement would be
enforceable against countries that have failed to meet the
requisite standards, thus increasing the potential for
compliance—and, if the instrument is drafted so that the legal
standards are stringent ones, efficacy.128
As with the notion of a broad-based UN instrument,
however, the challenges to such a scenario arise largely as a
function of platform-related politics. As legal scholar Boyan
Konstantinov stated eloquently: “[The] WTO seems to lack
visionaries to serve as catalysts of the political will.”129
Konstantinov argues that, because an increasing number of
WTO members are not democratic (and thus presumptively
unsupportive of so-called human rights creep), and because the
WTO “lacks a system on non-trade related requirements such as
the requirement that Member States respect, protect, and fulfil
[sic] human rights . . . the likelihood [of] incorporat[ing]

resources/policy/health/downloads/bp04_priced.rtf; Press Release, Doctors Without
Borders, WTO & Drugs: Will the Majority Prevail? (Nov. 11, 2001), available at
http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/press/release.cfm?id=688&cat=press-release.
125. TRIPS art. 64(1); DSU art. 4 n.4.
126. See June Carbone & Paige Gottheim, Markets, Subsidies, Regulation, and Trust:
Building Ethical Understandings into the Market for Fertility Services, 9 J. GENDER RACE &
JUST. 509, 512 (2006) (describing a “race to the bottom” as “competition in laxity by
which jurisdictions compete to attract new industries by providing a favorable
regulatory climate”); see also id. at 521–37 (discussing the impact of the “race to the
bottom” on fertility tourism).
127. See generally Humbyrd, supra note 18 (advocating a “fair trade” international
standard for surrogacy to ensure that all parties benefit and surrogates are not
exploited).
128. See Raustiala, supra note 99, at 610 (addressing the relationship between
efficacy and compliance and noting the importance of “stringency of the legal
standard” in changing the behavioral baseline of parties).
129. Konstantinov, supra note 122, at 337; see also, e.g., Lance Compa, International
Labor Standards and Instruments of Recourse for Working Women, 17 YALE J. INT’L L. 151,
166–67 (1992) (noting that General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade negotiators in
the early 1990s were unwilling to address the potential for including substantive labor
rights in the instrument, preferring instead to focus on removing barriers to trade).
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human rights issues [moves] farther and farther [away].”130 In
short, it is unlikely that a surrogacy-specific, human rightssensitive instrument will have any hope of being proposed,
much less drafted and implemented.
Furthermore, even if such an instrument did have the
political will to be created and welcomed into the WTO fold,
there is a risk that the WTO’s touted enforcement mechanisms
would not achieve their intended result. Dispute resolution is
“costly and time-consuming,”131 and, while countries obviously
would make such an investment to protect their access to
international markets in traditional goods and services, they may
not be as willing to spend the necessary capital when the issue is
protecting the human rights of citizens of other countries.132
Moreover, as is ubiquitously argued by trade and health
commentators, the WTO panels and appellate bodies are staffed
with international trade experts who lack the expertise to make
decisions about what would be, in the case of surrogacy, issues of
bioethics and substantive human rights law.133 Indeed,
Konstantinov notes that WTO dispute settlement bodies
frequently have “found protectionism,”134 and thus, presumably,

130. Konstantinov, supra note 122, at 337.
131. See Diana Tussie & Valentina Delich, Dispute Settlement Between Developing
Countries: Argentina and Chilean Price Bands, in MANAGING THE CHALLENGES OF WTO
PARTICIPATION: 45 CASE STUDIES 23, 23 (Peter Gallagher et al. eds, 2005), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/casestudies_e/case1_e.htm (noting that
the WTO dispute resolution system is “accessible only to highly profitable sectors
because participation is too costly and time consuming”).
132. Furthermore, a contracting parent who is able to contract for a child on
terms more advantageous to himself due to a foreign country’s lack of creation or
enforcement of its own laws is hardly likely to petition his government to change the
situation.
133. See Gabrielle Marceau, WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights, 13 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 753, 765–66 (2002) (“[P]anelists and members of the Appellate Body are trade
experts, not experts in human rights or labour . . . law.”); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann,
Human Rights, Constitutionalism and the World Trade Organization: Challenges for World
Trade Organization Jurisprudence and Civil Society, 19 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 633, 636 (2006)
(“[T]rade diplomats in the WTO have neither a mandate nor the expertise to discuss
human rights.”); Zagel, supra note 122, at 35, 36 (noting “Dispute Settlement
institutions’ lack of expertise on human rights issues,” but suggesting that it may be
possible to solve that problem “by integrating human rights experts to examine the
case from a human rights perspective”); Lisa Hird Chung, Note, Free Trade in Human
Reproductive Cells: A Solution to Procreative Tourism and the Unregulated Internet, 15 MINN.
J. INT’L L. 263, 295–96 (2006) (discussing WTO concerns in the context of gametes).
134. Konstantinov, supra note 122, at 325.
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required a lowering of existing barriers to trade (some of which
may have been argued to be an exception, for example, to
protect the public’s health under Article XX of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade135). However, an institutional
bias toward free trade leaves an unacceptable risk of exploitation
for those involved in the surrogacy “trade.”136
B. Labor
As legalized surrogacy is, indeed, paid labor (in the truest
sense of the word),137 it is unsurprising that commentators have
argued for the use of labor law or labor rights frameworks to
address the substantive challenges of surrogacy regulation.138 In
an endeavor to advance the practical discussion of international
surrogacy regulation, then, the next logical platform to
investigate is that of the ILO.139 Simply stated, “[t]he ILO is the
135. Id. at 328–29.
136. See Humbyrd, supra note 18, at 118 (“The absence of regulations has created
a market that is free but not fair, providing fertile ground for unjust and exploitative
practices.”). As a logical matter, however, commentators who have called for
international regulation—or, indeed, any regulation at all—necessarily argue that a
lack of regulation, which is the ultimate “free trade” scenario, results in too much risk
for the parties involved in surrogacy. See, e.g., id. at 115–16; Lee, supra note 8, at 281–
83.
137. Many commentators recognize (implicitly or explicitly) surrogacy as labor.
See, e.g., Damelio & Sorensen, supra note 25, at 271 (“Surrogacy is more like the case of
being paid for the service. The contracting couple does not gain a right to do whatever
they please with the woman’s body while she carries the child. The most they can do is
ask that she do with her body what she agreed to do in the contract. In surrogacy, then,
a woman is not ‘selling her body’ but being compensated for her services.”); Humbyrd,
supra note 18, at 112 (comparing the risks of surrogacy to those in other workplaces in
developing countries); Pande, supra note 14, at 293 (“[C]ommercial surrogacy is a
form of labor.”).
138. See, e.g., Humbyrd, supra note 18, at 117–18 (arguing for “fair trade”-type
regulations, including laws governing working conditions); McEwen, supra note 18, at
300–01 (discussing the application of existing ILO frameworks and instruments to the
problem of surrogacy regulation); Rimm, supra note 6, at 1453–54 (advocating for a
“labor rights” regulatory framework for surrogacy).
139. See Ilse L. Feitshans, Is There a Human Right to Reproductive Health?, 8 TEX. J.
WOMEN & L. 93, 119–26 (1998) (discussing the ILO’s role in articulating human rights
and suggesting its utility for protecting a right to reproductive health for female
workers); McEwen, supra note 18, at 300–01 (discussing existing ILO instruments that
may be useful in regulating surrogacy). Ilse Feitshans uses the ILO as an example of an
organization whose policies and instruments support the existence of a right to
reproductive health that must be protected as part of workers’ occupational health. See
Feitshans, supra, at 119–26. While her article does not appear to contemplate or analyze
the creation of a surrogacy-specific instrument under the auspices of the ILO, she
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international organization responsible for drawing up and
overseeing international labour standards.”140 In general, the
ILO promotes such values as equality, decent work, and good
and safe working conditions for all laborers.141 Indeed, the ILO’s
Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multilateral
Enterprises and Social Policy reflects values applicable to
international surrogacy, particularly given concerns about the
power imbalance between, for example, poor women and the
organizations that may wish to lure them into surrogacy
service.142 Furthermore, the ILO’s aims and principles appear
consistent with human rights,143 although there may be only a
partial overlap between the human rights normally considered
pertinent to the ILO’s mission and those considered pertinent
to the debate on surrogacy.144
Significantly, the ILO has a “tripartite structure” (the
International Labour Conference, the Governing Body, and the
International Labour Office145) that permits representatives of
governments, employers, and workers to provide input
regarding labor-related standards and policies.146 Thus, for any
new surrogacy-specific standards, there is at least a theoretical
potential that both surrogates and procurers of surrogacy
nevertheless recognizes in her conclusion that surrogates may need special attention in
any articulation or protection of the right to reproductive health, whether the
articulation comes under existing laws or under new instruments. See id. at 124–25.
140. About the ILO, INT’L LABOUR ORG., http://www.ilo.org/global/about-theilo/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2012).
141. See Decent Work Agenda, INT’L LABOUR ORG., http://www.ilo.org/global/
about-the-ilo/decent-work-agenda/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2012).
142. McEwen, supra note 18, at 300. Rimm also recognizes the problem of
powerful, and potentially exploitative, intermediary entities, although her discussion of
labor frameworks is a more general one and is not tied specifically to the ILO as an
institution. Rimm, supra note 6, at 1456–59.
143. See Zagel, supra note 122, at 6 (stating that “[h]uman rights are also to be
understood generally to encompass not only the rights contained in the ‘International
Bill of Rights,’ but also basic social standards, as protected by the [ILO]”); id. at 36
(suggesting that the ILO could provide technical assistance to the WTO in making
decisions pertaining to human rights issues in the trade context); see also McEwen,
supra note 18, at 299–300 (discussing the right to receive fair compensation under the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights).
144. But see Feitshans, supra note 139, at 119–24 (discussing the importance of the
ILO as part of the author’s advocacy for the right to reproductive health).
145. How the ILO Works, INT’L LABOUR ORG., http://www.ilo.org/global/aboutthe-ilo/how-the-ilo-works/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2012).
146. See id.
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services could have a voice in the debate. The potential is
theoretical because it is difficult to imagine that surrogates
would unionize, or, if they did, that they would have the medical
expertise necessary to understand and advocate for their healthrelated needs. Prospective contracting parents also may not be
likely to petition for a place in ILO’s decisionmaking process, as
one could assume that their interest in surrogacy may be limited
only to the gestation and birth of their own child or children.
Despite these concerns, all parties’ interests could be
represented via government participation in ILO discussions,
particularly with respect to the balance of rights and protections
each of the parties should receive.
One substantive challenge, however, is that the particular
work-related risks for surrogates are truly unique in the labor
world and, one could argue, are even unique to each pregnancy.
Furthermore, unlike most other types of employment, all the
workplace protection in the world cannot entirely eliminate the
risks inherent in surrogacy.147 Additionally, as most legal labor
practices worldwide presumably lack the types of moral and
ethical qualms inherent in the practice of surrogacy, the
question arises whether the ILO has the institutional expertise
to provide substantive answers to the difficult questions the
surrogacy industry faces. There is no mechanism for
enforcement of ILO laws, and so any surrogacy-related standard
must be constructed to encourage effectiveness—even without
the threat of sanctions.148

147. It should be noted that the workplace protections for surrogates necessarily
will differ in some respects from workplace protections for female workers in another
field who merely wish to preserve their reproductive rights (e.g., to remain pregnant or
to retain fertility). For example, Feitshans focuses largely on such issues as toxicity and
disease in the workplace and “protective reassignment” of pregnant women to avoid
workplace hazards. See Feitshans, supra note 139, at 95, 100–01, 105–08, 110. While
protection of surrogates from toxic chemicals and disease certainly is important, a
surrogacy-specific agreement under the ILO would need to address additional
fundamental issues that would help protect rights other than simply reproductive
rights, or the right to preserve fertility and protect against fetal damage. The fact that
surrogates’ actual work is the pregnancy will require considerably more attention to the
nature and extent of permissible work contracts, the ability of the surrogate and/or the
contracting parents to make decisions regarding the appropriate level of medical care,
et cetera.
148. See Andrew T. Guzman, The Design of International Agreements, 16 EUR. J. INT’L
L. 579, 607 (2005) (noting that the ILO has no enforcement mechanism beyond some
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On balance, an ILO-based instrument would appear to
favor surrogates149 because of both its institutional purpose in
protecting labor rights and its commitment to fundamental
human rights. After all, in the eyes of the international
community, this is likely to be an acceptable imbalance in the
recognition and protection of surrogates’ rights vis-à-vis the
rights of the contracting parents. An ILO-based instrument
certainly would contrast favorably with a free-trade-based
instrument, in which the imbalance would benefit the
contracting parents.150 Nevertheless, the relatively limited scope
of the ILO’s mandate might risk excluding the children born of
surrogacy from protection as well as ignoring some of the truly
international legal barriers to consistent treatment, such as
immigration and citizenship laws. However, while piecemeal
regulation of surrogacy is a risky proposition, due to the
interrelated nature of the pertinent legal issues, the potential for
disproportionate protections of one party over another, and the
concern that political will may last long enough to create only
one surrogacy-related instrument from whole cloth, it remains
possible that some of the children’s interests could be protected
by minor changes to existing instruments.151 Should a global
consensus be reached about the substantive boundaries of
ethical international surrogacy, such an “ILO plus” plan may be
a feasible solution.

monitoring procedures). But see Feitshans, supra note 139, at 123–24 (suggesting the
utility of ILO reporting mechanisms and “public shaming” in ILO’s successes).
149. This argument is made by proponents of a labor-based framework for
regulating surrogacy, regardless of national or international scope, or choice of
lawmaking platform. See, e.g., Feitshans, supra note 139, at 119–26 (discussing ILO’s
role in supporting a right to reproductive health); McEwen, supra note 18, at 300–01
(discussing the benefits to surrogates under an application of the ILO’s Tripartite
Declaration of Principles Concerning Multilateral Enterprises and Social Policy);
Rimm, supra note 6, at 1454–61 (focusing on protecting surrogates).
150. See supra notes 116–21 and accompanying text (describing how
implementing a WTO-based instrument likely would likely lower barriers to the
industry so that the contracting parents would benefit at the expense of the service
providers).
151. See, e.g., Leibowitz-Dori, supra note 30, at 350–54 (discussing the possible
inclusion of surrogacy in the Convention on Intercountry Adoption and in the Hague
Convention).
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CONCLUSION
In sum, while a broad-based instrument governing
surrogacy is ideal, it is unlikely to succeed because of the
political barriers inherent in such a massive undertaking. The
international community has several mechanisms by which it
could spur consensus building discussions regarding gestational
surrogacy and, should the community achieve consensus on key
issues, regulation under the auspices of the ILO may be a
reasonable, if imperfect, vehicle for achieving legal uniformity in
protecting surrogates from exploitation.

